Abstract-We present a framework for fully-simulatable h-out-of-n oblivious transfer (OT n h ) with security against non-adaptive malicious adversaries. The framework costs six communication rounds and costs at most 40n public-key operations in computational overhead. Compared with the known protocols for fully-simulatable oblivious transfer that works in the plain mode (where there is no trusted common reference string available) and proven to be secure under standard model (where there is no random oracle available), the instantiation based on the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption of the framework is the most efficient one, no matter seen from communication rounds or computational overhead.
INTRODUCTION

Oblivious transfer
O BLIVIOUS transfer (OT), first introduced by [49] and later defined in another way with equivalent effect [16] by [18] , is a fundamental primitive in cryptography and a concrete problem in the filed of secure multi-party computation. Considerable cryptographic protocols can be built from it. Most remarkable, [27] , [31] , [34] , [56] proves that any secure multi-party computation can be based on a secure oblivious transfer protocol. In this paper, we concern a variant of OT, h-out-of-n oblivious transfer (OT n h ). OT n h deals with the following scenario. A sender holds n private messages m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m n . A receiver holds h private positive integers i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i h , where i 1 < i 2 < . . . < i h n. The receiver expects to get the messages m i1 , m i2 , . . . , m i h without leaking any information about his private input, i.e., the h positive integers he holds. The sender expects all new knowledge learned by the receiver from their interaction is at most h messages. Obviously, the OT most literature refer to is OT 2 1 and can be viewed as a special case of OT n h . Considering a variety of attack we have to confront in real environment, a protocol for OT n h with security against malicious adversaries (a malicious adversary may act in any arbitrary malicious way to learn as much extra information as possible) is more desirable than the one with security against semi-honest adversaries (a semi-honest adversary, on one side, honestly does everything told by a prescribed protocol; on one side, records the messages he sees to deduce extra information which is not supposed to be known to he). Using Goldreich's compiler [24] , [27] , we can gain the former version from the corresponding latter version. However, the resulting protocol is prohibitive expensive for practical use, because it is embedded with so many invocations of zero-knowledge for NP. Thus, directly constructing the protocol based on specific intractability assumptions seems more feasible.
The first step in this direction is independently made by [44] and [1] which respectively presents a tworound efficient protocol for OT 2 1 based on the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption. Starting from these works and using the tool smooth projective hashing, [32] abstracts and generalizes the ideas of [1] , [44] to a framework for OT 2 1 . Besides DDH assumption, the framework can be instantiated under the decisional N -th residuosity (DNR) assumption and decisional quadratic residuosity (DQR) assumption [32] .
Unfortunately, these protocols (or frameworks) are only half-simulatable not fully-simulatable. By saying a protocol is fully-simulatable, we means that the protocol can be strictly proven its security under the real/ideal model simulation paradigm. The paradigm requires that for any adversary in the real world, there exists a corresponding adversary simulating him in the ideal world. Thus, the real adversary can not do more harm than the corresponding ideal adversary does. Therefore the security level of the protocol is guaranteed not to be lower than that of the ideal world. Undesirably, a half-simulatable protocol for OT 2 1 only provides a simulator in the case the receiver is corrupted such as [1] , [44] or in the case the sender is corrupted such as [32] .
Considering security, requiring a protocol to be fullysimulatable is necessary. Specifically, a fully-simulatable protocol provides security against all kinds of attacks, especially the future unknown attacks taken by any adversary whose computational resource is fixed when constructing the protocol (generally, it is assumed that the adversaries run arbitrary probabilistic polynomialtime) [7] , [24] , while a not fully-simulatable protocol doesn't. For example, the protocols proposed by [1] , [32] , [44] suffer the selective-failure attacks, in which a malicious sender can induce transfer failures that are dependent on the messages that the receiver requests [45] .
Constructing fully-simulatable protocols for OT with security against malicious adversaries naturally becomes the focus of the research community. [6] first presents such a fully-simulatable protocol. In detail, the OT is an adaptive h-out-n oblivious transfer (denoted by OT n h×1 in related literature) and based on q-Power Decisional Diffie-Hellman and q-Strong Diffie-Hellman assumptions. Unfortunately, these two assumptions are not standard assumptions used in cryptography and seem significantly stronger than DDH, DQR and so on. Motivated by basing OT on weaker complexity assumption, [28] presents a protocol for OT n h using a blind identity-based encryption which is based on decisional bilinear DiffieHellman (DBDH) assumption. Using cut-choose technique, [36] later presents two efficient protocols for fullysimulatable OT 2 1 respectively based on DDH assumption and DNR assumption, where the DDH-based protocol is the most efficient one among these fully-simulatable works.
The protocols mentioned above are proved their securities in the plain stand-alone model which not necessarily allows concurrent composition with other arbitrary malicious protocols. [48] overcomes this weakness and further the research by presenting a framework under common reference string (CRS) model for fullysimulatable, universally composable OT 2 1 and instantiating the framework respectively under DDH, DQR and worst-case lattice assumption. It is notable that conditioning on a trusted CRS is available, the DDHbased instantiation of the framework is the most efficient protocol for OT 2 1 no matter seen from the number of communication rounds or the computational overhead. Recently, [20] , using a novel compiler and somewhat non-committing encryption they present, convert [48] 's instantiations based on DDH, DQR to the corresponding protocols with higher security level. In more detail, the resulting protocols for OT 2 1 are secure against adaptive malicious adversaries, which corrupts the parties dynamically based on his knowledge gathered so far. Note that, the fully-simulatable protocols for OT 2 1 mentioned so far except the one presented by [6] are only secure against non-adaptive malicious adversaries, which only corrupts the parties preset before the running of the protocol.
Though constructing protocols for fully-simulatable OT 2 1 with security against malicious adversaries has been studied well, constructing protocols for such OT n h hasn't. We note that there are some works aiming to extend known cryptographic protocols to OT n h . [42] shows how to implementation OT n h using log n invocation of OT 2 1 under half-simulation. A similar implementation for adaptive OT n h can be seen in [43] . What's more, the same authors of [42] , [43] propose a way to transform a singe-server private-information retrieval scheme (PIR) into an oblivious transfer scheme under half-simulation too [45] . With the help of a random oracle, [30] shows how to extend k oblivious transfers (for some security parameter k) into many more, without much additional effort. However, the Random Oracle Model is risky. First, [10] shows that a scheme is secure in the Random Oracle Model does not necessarily imply that a particular implementation of it (in the real world) is secure, or even that this scheme does not have any "structural flaws". Second, [10] shows efficient implementing the random oracle is impossible. Later, [35] finds that the randomoracle instantiations proposed by Bellare and Rogaway from 1993 and 1996, and the ones implicit in IEEE P1363 and PKCS standards are weaker than a random oracle. What is worse, [35] shows that how the hash function defects deadly damages the securities of the cryptographic schemes presented in [4] , [5] . Therefore, in this paper, we only consider the schemes which are fullysimulatable and without turning to a random oracle. To our best knowledge, only [6] and [28] respectively present such fully-simulatable protocols for OT n h . However, the assumptions the former uses are not standard and the latter uses is too expensive. Therefore, a wellmotivated problem is to find a protocol or framework for efficient, fully-simulatable, secure against malicious adversaries OT n h under weaker complexity assumptions.
Our Contribution
In this paper, we present a framework for efficient, fully-simulatable, secure against non-adaptive malicious adversaries OT n h whose security is proven under stand model (i.e., without turning to a random oracle). To our best knowledge, this is the first framework for such OT n h . The framework have the following features, 1) Fully-simulatable and secure against malicious adversaries without using a CRS. [32] 's framework for OT 2 1 is half-simulatable. Thought [48] 's framework for OT authenticated communication channel, implementing a universal composable protocol providing useful trusted CRS in the presence of malicious adversaries is impossible. Therefore, considering practical use, our framework are better. 2) Efficient. Compared with the existing protocols for fully-simulatable OT that without resorting to a CRS or a random oracle, i.e., the protocols presented by [6] , [28] , [36] , the DDH-based instantiation of our framework costs the minimum number of communication rounds and costs the minimum computational overhead. Please see Section 4.4 and Section 4.5 for the detailed comparisons. We admit that, in the context of a trusted CRS is available and only OT 2 1 is needed, the DDH-based instantiation of [48] is the most efficient one.
3) Abstract and modular. The framework is described using just three high-level cryptographic tools, i.e., perfectly binding commitment (PBC), perfectly hiding commitment (PHC) and our new smooth projective hash (denoted by SP HDHC t,h for simplicity). This allows a simple and intuitive understanding of its security. 4) Generally realizable. The high-level cryptographic tools PBC, PHC and SP HDHC t,h are realizable from a variety of known specific assumptions, even future assumptions maybe. This makes our framework generally realizable. In particular, we instantiate SP HDHC t,h from the DDH assumption, the DNR assumption, the DQR assumption and the lattice assumption. Instantiating PBC or PHC under specific assumptions is beyond the scope of this paper. Please see [23] , [26] for such examples. Generally realizability is vital to make the framework live long, considering the future progress in breaking a specific intractable problem. If this case happen, replacing the instantiation based on the broken problem with that based on a unbroken problem suffices.
What is more, we fix a folklore [36] that it appears technically difficult to instantiate the projective hash under lattice assumption by presenting a lattice-based SP HDHC t,h instantiation. It is notable that we gain an OT n h instantiation which is secure against quantum algorithms, using this lattice-based SP HDHC t,h instantiation and appropriate lattice-based commitment schemes. Considering that factoring integers and finding discrete logarithms are efficiently feasible for quantum algorithms [52] - [54] , this is an example showing the benefits from the generally realizability of the framework.
As an independent contribution, we present several propositions/lemmas related to the indistinguishability of probability ensembles defined by sampling polynomial instances. Such propositions/lemmas simplify our security proof very much. We believe that they are as useful in security proof somewhere else as in this paper.
Our Approach
We note that the smooth projective hash is a good abstract tool. Using this tool, [32] in fact presents a framework for half-simulatable OT 2 1 , [21] present a framework for password-based authenticated key exchange protocols. We also note that the cut-and-choose is a good technique to make protocol fully-simulatable. Using this tool, [36] present several fully-simulatable protocol for OT 2 1 , [37] presents a general fully-simulatable protocol for two-party computation. Indeed, we are inspired by such works. Our basic ideal is to use cut-and-choose technique and smooth projective hash to get a fullysimulatable framework.
Loosely speaking, a smooth projective hash (SPH) is a set of operations defined over two languagesL andL, whereL ∩L = ∅. For any projective instanceẋ ∈L, there are two ways to obtain its hash value, i.e., the way using its hash key or the way using its projective key and its witnessẇ. For any smooth instanceẍ ∈L, there is only one way to obtain its hash value, i.e., the way using its hash key. The version of SPH presented by [32] (denoted by V SP HH for simplicity) holds a property called verifiable smoothness that can judge whether at least one of arbitrary two instances is smooth. Another property V SP HH holds, called hard subset membership, makes sureẍ andẋ are computationally indistinguishable.
We observe that the V SP HH indeed is easy to be extended to deal with OT n 1 , but seems difficult to be extended to deal with the general OT n h . The reason is that, to hold verifiable smoothness,ẋs andẍs have to be generated in a dependent way. This makes the verifiable smoothness for multipleẋs and multipleẍs (i.e., judge whether at least n − h of arbitrary n instances are smooth) difficult to hold without leaking information which is conductive to distinguish suchẋs andẍs. We also observe that, there is no way to construct a fullysimulatable framework using V SP HH, because there is no way to extract the real input of the adversary in the case that the receiver is corrupted.
We define a new smooth projective hash called tsmooth h-projective hash family that holds properties distinguishability, hard subset membership, feasible cheating (denoted by SP HDHC t,h for simplicity). The key solution in SP HDHC t,h to the mentioned problems is that requiring eachẍ to hold a witness too. This solution enables us to generateẋs andẍs in a independent way. Correspondingly, the verifiable smoothness is not needed any more and replaced by a property called distinguishability, which provides a way to distinguisḣ xs andẍs if their witnesses are given.
Since the receiver encodes his input as a permutation ofẋs andẍs, a simulator can the extract the real input of the adversary in the case that the receiver is corrupted if their witnesses are available. Combining the application of the technique cut-and-choose, a simulator can see such witnesses by rewinding the adversary. To extract the real input of the adversary in the case that the sender is corrupted, the property feasible cheating provides way to cheat out of the real input of the adversary. Naturally, all the properties and the correlated algorithm in SP HDHC t,h are extended to deal with n instances rather than only 2 instances. Please see Section 3.2 for a detailed comparison this new hash with previous hash systems.
We show that constructing SP HDHC t,h can be reduced to constructing considerably simpler hash systems. Our lattice-based SP HDHC t,h instantiation is builded on the lattice-based cryptosystem presented by [36] . It is noticeable that it appears difficult to get latticebased instantiation for SP H [36] . Our solution is to let the instance x (x ∈L ∪L) be available to the algorithm that is responsible for generating pair of the hash key and the projective key. The other three intractabilityassumption-based SP HDHC t,h instantiations can be ultimately built from known SPH schemes such as that presented by [32] with necessary modifications.
Using SP HDHC t,h we construct the framework described with high-level as follows .
1) The receiver generates hash parameters and appropriate many instance vectors, then sends them to the sender after disordering each vector. 2) The receiver and the sender cooperate to toss coin to decide which vector to be opened. 3) The receiver opens the chosen instances, encodes his private input by reordering each unchosen vector and sends the resulting code, which in fact is a sequence of permutations, to the sender. 4) The sender checks that the chosen vectors are generated in the legal way which guarantees that the receiver learns at most h message. If the check pass, the sender encrypts his private input (i.e., the n messages he holds) using the hash values of the instances of the unchosen vectors in the way indicated by the code of receiver's private input, and sends the ciphertexts together with some auxiliary information (i.e., the projective hash keys) that is conductive to decrypt some ciphertexts to the receiver. 5) The receiver decrypts the ciphertexts with the help of the auxiliary information and gains the messages he expects. Intuitively speaking, the receiver's security is implied by the property hard subset membership of SP HDHC t,h . This property guarantees that the receiver can securely encode his private input by reordering each unchosen instance vector. The sender's security is implied by the cut-and-choose technique, which guarantees that the probability that the adversaries controlling a corrupted receiver learns extra new knowledge is negligible.
Organization
In Section 2, we describe the notations used in this paper, the security definition of OT n h , the definition of commitment scheme. In Section 3, we define our new hash system, i.e., SP HDHC t,h . In Section 4, we construct our framework. In Section 5, we prove the security of the framework. In Section 6, we reduce constructing SP HDHC t,h to constructing considerably simpler hash systems. In Section 7, we instantiate SP HDHC t,h under the lattice, DDH, DNR, DQR assumptions, respectively.
PRELIMINARIES
Most notations and concepts mentioned in this section originate from [7] , [23] , [24] which are basic literature in the filed of secure multi-party computation (SMPC). We tailor them to the need of dealing with OT n h .
Basic Notations
We denote an unspecified positive polynomial by poly(.). We denote the set consists of all natural numbers by N.
We denote the set consists of all prime numbers by P.
We denote security parameter used to measure security and complexity by k. A function µ(.) is negligible in k, if there exists a positive constant integer n 0 , for any poly(.) and any k which is greater than n 0 (for simplicity, we later call such k sufficiently large k), it holds that µ(k) < 1/poly(k). A probability ensemble X def = {X(1 k , a)} k∈N,a∈{0,1} * is an infinite sequence of random variables indexed by (k, a), where a represents various types of inputs used to sample the instances according to the distribution of the random variable X(1 k , a). Probability ensemble X is polynomial-time constructible, if there exists a probabilistic polynomialtime (PPT) sample algorithm S X (.) such that for any a, any k, the random variables S X (1 k , a) and X(1 k , a) are identically distributed. We denote sampling an instance according to
,1} * be two probability ensembles. They are computationally indistinguishable, denoted X c = Y , if for any non-uniform PPT algorithm D with an infinite auxiliary information sequence z = (z k ) k∈N (where each z k ∈ {0, 1} * ), there exists a negligible function µ(.) such that for any sufficiently large k, any a, it holds that
They are same, denoted X = Y , if for any sufficiently large k, any a, X(1 k , a) and Y (1 k , a) are defined in the same way. They are equal, denoted X ≡ Y , if for any sufficiently large k, any a, the distributions of X(1 k , a) and
Let x be a vector (note that arbitrary binary string can be viewed as a vector). We denote its i-th element by x i , denote its dimensionality by # x, denote its length in bits by | x|. For any positive integers set I, any vector x, x I def = ( x i ) i∈I,i≤# x . Let M be a probabilistic (interactive) Turing machine. By M r (.) we denote M 's output generated at the end of an execution using randomness r.
. Let x ∈ χ Y denotes sampling an instance x from domain Y according to the distribution law (or probability density function ) χ. Specifically, let x ∈ U Y denotes uniformly sampling an instance x from domain Y .
Security Definition Of A Protocol For
OT n h involves two parties, party P 1 (i.e., the sender) and party P 2 (i.e., the receiver). OT n h 's functionality is formally defined as follows
where
• k is the public security parameter.
• m ∈ ({0, 1} * ) n is P 1 's private input, and each | m i | is the same.
• λ denotes a empty string and is supposed to be got by P 1 . That is, P 1 is supposed to get nothing.
• m H is supposed to be got by P 2 . Note that, the length of all parties' private input have to be identical in SMPC (please see [24] for the reason and related discussion). This means that | m| = |H| is required. Without loss of generality, in this paper, we assume | m| = |H| always holds, because padding can be easily used to meet such requirement.
Intuitively speaking, the security of OT n h requires that P 1 can't learn any new knowledge -typically, P 2 's private input, from the interaction at all, and P 2 can't learn more than h messages held by P 1 . To capture the security in a formal way, the concepts such as adversary, trusted third party, ideal world, real world were introduced. Note that the security target in this paper is to be secure against non-adaptive malicious adversaries, so only concepts related to this case is referred to in the following.
Non-Adaptive Malicious Adversary
Before running OT n h , the adversary A has to corrupt all parties listed in I ⊆ [2] . In the case that U ∈ {P 1 , P 2 } is not corrupted, U will strictly follow the prescribed protocol as an honest party. In the case that party U is corrupted, U will be fully controlled by A as a corrupted party. In this case, U will have to pass all his knowledge to A before the protocol runs and follows A's instructions from then on -so there is a probability that U arbitrarily deviates from prescribed protocol. In fact, after A finishes corrupting, A and all corrupted parties have formed a coalition led by A to learn as much extra knowledge, e.g. the honest parties' private inputs, as possible. From then on, they share knowledge with each other and coordinate their behavior. Without loss of generality, we can view this coalition as follows. All corrupted parties are dummy. A receives messages addressed to the members of the coalition and sends messages on behalf of the members.
Loosely speaking, we say OT n h is secure, if and only if, for any malicious adversary A, the knowledge A learns in the real world is not more than that he learns in the ideal world. In other words, if and only if, for any malicious adversary A, what harm A can do in real world is not more than what harm he can do in the ideal world. In the ideal world, there is an incorruptible trusted third party (TTP). All parties hand their private inputs to TTP. TTP computes f and sends back f (.) i to P i . In the real world, there is no TTP, and the computation of f (.) is finished by A and all parties' interactions. Initial Inputs. All entities know the public security parameter k. P 1 holds a private input m ∈ ({0, 1} * ) n . Party P 2 holds a private input H ∈ Ψ. Adversary A holds a name list I ⊆ [2] , a randomness r A ∈ {0, 1} * and an infinite auxiliary input sequence z = (z k ) k∈N , where z k ∈ {0, 1} * . Before proceeds to next stage, A corrupts parties listed in I and learns x I , where x def = ( m, H). Submitting inputs to TTP. Each honest party P i always submits its private input x i unchanged to TTP. A submits arbitrary string based on his knowledge to TTP for the corrupted parties. The string TTP receives is a two-dimensional vector y which is formally described as follows.
OT
Obviously, there is a probability that x = y.
TTP computing f . TTP checks that y is a valid input to f , i.e., no entry of y is of the form abort i . If y passes the check, then TTP computes f and sets w to be f (1 k , y). Otherwise, TTP sets w to be (abort i , abort i ). Finally, for each i ∈ [n] TTP hands w i to each P i respectively and halts.
Outputs. Each honest party P i always outputs the message w i it obtains from the TTP. Each corrupted party P i outputs nothing (i.e., λ). The adversary outputs something generated by executing arbitrary function of the information he gathers so far. Without loss of generality, this can be assumed to be (1 k , I, r A , z k , x I , w I ).
The output of the whole execution in the ideal world, denoted by Ideal f,I,A(z k ) (1 k , m, H), is defined by the outputs of all parties and that of the adversary as follows.
Obviously, Ideal f,A(z),I (1 k , x) is a random variable whose randomness is r A . Initial Inputs. Initial input each entity holds in the real world is the same as in the ideal world but there are some difference as follows. A randomness r i is held by each party P i . After finishes corrupting, in addition to the knowledge A learns in ideal world, the corrupted parties' randomness r I is also learn by A, where r def = (r 1 , r 2 ).
Computing f . In the real world, computing f is finished by all entities' interaction. Each honest party strictly follows the prescribed protocol (i.e., the concrete protocol, usually denoted π , for OT n h ). The corrupted parties have to follow A's instructions and may arbitrarily deviate from prescribed protocol.
Outputs. Each honest party P i always outputs what the prescribed protocol instructs. Each corrupted party P i outputs nothing. The adversary outputs something generated by executing arbitrary function of the information he gathers so far. Without loss of generality, this can be assumed to be a string consisting of 1 k , I, r A , r I , z k , x I and messages addressed to the corrupted parties.
The output of the whole execution in the real world, denoted by Real π,I,A(z k ) (1 k , m, H, r A , r), is defined by the outputs of all parties and that of the adversary as follows.
Obviously, Real π,I,A(z k ) (1 k , m, H) is a random variable whose randomnesses are r A and r.
Security Definition
The security of a protocol for OT 
where the parameters input to the two probability ensembles are same and each m i is of the same length. The adversary A' in the ideal world is called a simulator of the adversary A in the real world.
The concept, non-uniform probabilistic expected polynomial-time, mentioned in Definition 1 is formulated in distinct way in distinct literature such as [8] , [23] . We prefer to the following definition [33] , because it is clearer in formulation and more closely related to our issue.
we denote a running which starts with M i holding a private input x i , a randomness r i , an auxiliary input z i , the public security parameter k. By 
where R 1 , R 2 are random variables with uniform distribution over {0, 1} * .
For Definition 1, it in fact requires that adversary A's simulator A ′ should run in expected polynomial-time with respect to TTP who computes OT n h 's functionality f .
We point out that the security definition presented in [7] , [23] , [24] requires the simulator A ′ to run in strictly polynomial-time, but the one presented in [8] , [36] , [37] allow A ′ to run in expected polynomial-time. Definition 1 follows the latter. We argue that this is justified, since [3] shows that there is no (non-trivial) constant-round zero-knowledge proof or argument having a strictly polynomial-time black-box simulator, which means allowing simulator to run in expected polynomial-time is essential for achieving constant-round protocols. See [33] for further discussion.
Commitment Scheme
In this section, we briefly introduce the cryptographic tool commitment scheme which will be used in our framework. For the strict definition and the details, please see [23] or [26] .
Definition 3 (commitment scheme, non-strict description, [23] , [26] ). A commitment scheme is a two-party protocol involving two phases.
• Initial Inputs. At the beginning, all parties know the public security parameter k. The unbounded sender P 1 holds a randomness r 1 ∈ {0, 1} * , a value m ∈ {0, 1} poly(k) to be committed to, where the polynomial poly(.) is public. The PPT receiver P 2 holds a randomness r 2 ∈ {0, 1} * .
• Commit Phase. P 1 computes a commitment, denoted α, based on his knowledge, i.e., α ← P 1 (1 k , m, r 1 ), then P 1 send α to P 2 .
-The security for P 1 is implied by the property computationally hiding, which prevents P 2 from knowledge of the value committed by P 1 . That is, for any PPT
where V iewC P2 (.) denotes P 2 's view in commit phase.
• Reveal Phase. P 1 computes and sends a de-commitment, which typically consists of m, r 1 , to P 2 to let P 2 know m. Receiving de-commitment, P 2 checks its validity. Typically P 2 checks that α = P 1 (1 k , m, r 1 ) holds. If decommitment pass the check, P 2 knows and accepts m.
-The security for P 2 is implied by the property perfectly binding, which guarantees that for any unbounded P 1 , any m 1 , m 2 ∈ {0, 1} poly(k) such that m 1 = m 2 , the probability that P 2 accepts m 2 while P 1 commits to m 1 is zero, where the probability is taken only over the randomness used by P 2 .
The above definition defines perfectly binding commitment schemes (denoted by PBC). Relaxing the property binding to allow the probability of successful cheat of unbounded P 1 to be negligible, then the above definition defines statically binding commitment schemes. Correspondingly, in the setting that P 1 is PPT and P 2 is unbounded, there exists perfectly hiding commitment schemes (denoted by PHC) and statically hiding commitment schemes, which provide perfectly hiding and statically hiding to P 1 respectively, and only computationally binding to P 2 . If a property is secure against unbounded adversaries, we say this property is information-theoretically secure. We remark that there is no commitment scheme holding both informationtheoretically binding and information-theoretically hiding.
A NEW SMOOTH PROJECTIVE HASH -SP HDHC t,h
The Definition Of SP HDHC t,h
In this section, we define a new smooth projective hash -t-smooth h-projective hash family that holds properties distinguishability, hard subset membership, feasible cheating, denoted SP HDHC t,h for simplicity, which will be used to construct our framework for OT n h . In section 7, we instantiate SP HDHC t,h respectively under four distinct intractability assumptions.
Let us recall some related works before defining SP HDHC t,h . [12] , [55] present the classic notation of "universal hashing". Based on "universal hashing", [15] first introduces the concept of universal projective hashing, smooth projective hashing and hard subset membership problem in terms of languages and sets. In order to construct a framework for password-based authenticated key exchange, [21] modifies such definition to some extent. That is, smoothness is defined over every instance of a language rather than a randomly chosen instance. [32] refines the modified version in terms of the procedures used to implement it. What is more, a new requirement called verifiable smoothness is added to the hashing so as to construct a framework for OT 2 1 . The resulting hashing is called verifiablely-smooth projective hash family that has hard subset membership property (denoted by V SP HH for simplicity). Note that, the framework presented by [32] is not fullysimulatable. The difference between SP HDHC t,h and the works mentioned above will be under a detailed discussion after we define SP HDHC t,h .
For clarity in presentation, we assume n = h + t always holds and introduce additional notations. Let
, π is a permutation}. Let π ∈ Π (to comply with other literature, we also use π somewhere to denote a protocol without bringing any confusion). Let x be an arbitrary vector. By π( x), we denote a vector resulted from applying π to x. That is, y = π( x), if and
Definition 4 (t-smooth h-projective hash family that holds properties distinguishability, hard subset membership and feasible cheating). H = (P G, IS, DI, KG, Hash, pHash, Cheat) is an t-smooth h-projective hash family that holds properties distinguishability, hard subset membership and feasible cheating (SP HDHC t,h ), if and only if H is specified as follows
• The parameter-generator P G is a PPT algorithm that takes a security parameter k as input and outputs a family parameter Λ, i.e., Λ ← P G(1 k ). Λ will be used as a parameter to define three relations
• The instance-sampler IS is a PPT algorithm that takes a security parameter k, a family parameter Λ as input and outputs a vector a, i.e., a ← IS(
T be a vector generated by IS. We call eachẋ 
What is more, we abuse notation ∈ to some extent. We write
and only if there exists a vector x
a such that x a = x and a ∈ Range(IS(1 k , Λ)). We write x ∈ Range(IS(1 k , Λ)) if and only if there exists a vector x such that x ∈ Range(IS(1 k , Λ)) and x is an entry of x.
• The distinguisher DI is a PPT algorithm that takes a security parameter k, a family parameter Λ and a pair strings (x, w) as input and outputs an indicator bit b,
• The key generator KG is a PPT algorithm that takes a security parameter k, a family parameter Λ and an instance x as input and outputs a hash key and a projection key, i.e., (hk, pk) ← KG(1 k , Λ, x).
• The hash Hash is a PPT algorithm that takes a security parameter k, a family parameter Λ, an instance x and a hash key hk as input and outputs a value y, i.e., y ← Hash(1 k , Λ, x, hk).
• The projection pHash is a PPT algorithm that takes a security parameter k, a family parameter Λ, an instance x, a witness w of x and a projection key pk as input and outputs a value y, i.e., y ← pHash(1 k , Λ, x, pk, w).
• The cheat Cheat is a PPT algorithm that takes a security parameter k, a family parameter Λ as input and outputs n elements ofṘ
and H has the following properties 1) Projection. Intuitively speaking, it requires that for any instanceẋ ∈ LṘ Λ , the hash value ofẋ is obtainable with the help of its witnessẇ. That is, for any sufficiently 
4) Hard Subset Membership. Intuitively speaking, it re-
quires that for any x ∈ Range(IS(1 k , Λ)), x can be disordered without being detected. That is, for any π ∈ Π, the two probability ensembles 
Remark 5 (The Witnesses Of The Instances
The Difference Between SP HDHC t,h And Related Hash Systems
Now we discuss the difference between our SP HDHC t,h and related hash systems previous works present or use. For simplicity, we only compare our SP HDHC t,h with the hash system V SP HH which is presented by [32] . We argue that this is justified, on the one hand, the version of [32] is the version holding most properties among previous works. On the other hand, the aim of [32] is the closest to ours. They aim to construct a framework for OT 2 1 which actually is half-simulatable, while we aim to establish a fully-simulatable framework for OT n h . Loosely speaking, our SP HDHC t,h can be viewed as a generalized version of V SP HH. Indeed, V SP HH resembles SP HDHC 1,1 very much and can be converted into SP HDHC 1,1 though some modification is needed. The essential differences are listed as follows.
1) The key difference is that, besides each projective instanceẋ holding a witnessẇ, SP HDHC t,h also requires each smooth instanceẍ to hold a witness w. 2) To deal with OT n h , SP HDHC t,h extends the IS algorithm to generate hẋs and tẍs in a invocation. As a natural result, SP HDHC t,h extends the property smoothness to hold with respect to tẍs, and extends the property hard subset membership to hold with respect to hẋs and tẍs.
3) In V SP HH there exists a instance test IT algorithm that takes two instances as input and outputs a bit indicating whether at least one of the two instances is smooth, i.e., b ← IT (x 1 , x 2 ). SP HDHC t,h discards this verifiability of smoothness and the correlated IT , and instead provides a distinguisher DI algorithm which is conducive to apply the technique cut-and-choose. 4) SP HDHC t,h requires a additional property feasible cheating and the necessary algorithm Cheat. This property provides a simulator with a way to extract the real inputs of the adversary in the case that the sender is corrupted. 5) SP HDHC t,h extends KG algorithm such that the information of the instance is available to it. This makes constructing hash system easier. In indeed, this makes lattice-based hash system come true which is thought difficult by [36] .
We observe that the V SP HH indeed is easy to be extended to deal with OT n 1 , but seems difficult to be extended to deal with the general OT n h . The reason is that, to hold verifiable smoothness,ẋs andẍs have to be generated in a dependent way. This makes designing IT dealing with n instances without leaking information which is conductive to distinguish suchẋs andẍs difficult. Therefore, even constructing a framework for OT n h that is half-simulatable as [32] seems impossible. We also observe that, there is no way to construct a fullysimulatable framework using V SP HH, because there is no way to extract the real input of the adversary in the case that the receiver is corrupted.
The difficulties mentioned above can be overcame by requiring eachẍ to hold a witness too. Since the receiver encodes his input as a permutation ofẋs andẍs, a simulator can the extract the real input of the adversary in the case that the receiver is corrupted if their witnesses are available. Combining the application of the technique cut-and-choose, a simulator can see such witnesses by rewinding the adversary. What is more, the implementation of DI is easier than that of its predecessor IT . Because the operated object essentially is a pair of the form (x, w) which is simpler than (x 1 , . . . , x n ) which is the general form of the objects operated by IT .
CONSTRUCTING A FRAMEWORK FOR FULLY-SIMULATABLE OT n h
In this section, we construct a framework for OT n h . In the framework, we will use a PPT algorithm, denoted Γ , that receiving B 1 , B 2 ∈ Ψ, outputs a uniformly chosen permutation π ∈ U Π such that π(B 1 ) = B 2 , i.e., π ← Γ(B 1 , B 2 ). We give an example implementation of Γ as follows.
Fourth, define π as π(i) = j if and only if j ⇋ i ∈ E. Finally, outputs π.
The Framework For OT n h
• Common inputs: All entities know the public security parameter k, an positive polynomial poly s (.), a SP HDHC t,h (where n = h + t) hash system H, a information-theoretically hiding commitment scheme (denoted by IHC), a informationtheoretically binding commitment scheme (denoted by IBC).
• Private Inputs: Party P 1 (i.e., the sender) holds a private input m ∈ ({0, 1} * ) n and a randomness r 1 ∈ {0, 1} * . Party P 2 ( i.e., the receiver) holds a private input H ∈ Ψ and a randomness r 2 ∈ {0, 1} * . The adversary A holds a name list I ⊆ [2] and a randomness r A ∈ {0, 1} * .
• Auxiliary Inputs: The adversary A holds an infinite auxiliary input sequence z = (z k ) k∈N , z k ∈ {0, 1} * .
The protocol works as follow. For clarity, we omit some trivial error-handlings such as P 1 refusing to send P 2 something which is supposed to be sent. Handling such errors is easy. P 2 halting and outputting abort 1 suffices.
• Receiver's step (R1): P 2 generates hash parameters and samples instances.
Without loss of generality, we assume a i = ((ẋ 1 ,ẇ 1 • Receiver's step (R2-R3)/Sender's step (S1-S2): P 1 and P 2 cooperate to toss coin to choose instance vectors to open.
3) P 1 and P 2 respectively sends each other the decommitments to IHC(s) or IBC(s ′ ), and respectively checks the received de-commitments are valid. If the check fails, P 1 (P 2 respectively) halts and outputs abort 2 (abort 1 respectively). If no check fails, then they proceed to next step. 4) P 1 and P 2 share a common randomness r = s⊕s ′ . The instance vectors whose index fall into CS
• Receiver's step (R4): P 2 opens the chosen instances to P 1 , encodes and sends his private input to P 1 . 1) P 2 opens the chosen instances to prove that the instances he generates are legal. P 2 sends ((i, j,˜ w i j )) i∈CS,j∈Ji to P 1 , where
2) P 2 encodes his private input and sends the resulting code to P 1 .
That is, P 2 encode his private input into sequences such as π 2 i (˜ x i ) where i ∈ CS. Note that P 2 can send ((i, j,˜ w i j )) i∈CS,j∈Ji and (π 2 i ) i∈CS in one step.
• Sender's step (S3): P 1 checks the chosen instances, encrypts and sends his private input to P 2 . 1) P 1 verifies that each chosen instance vectors is legal, i.e., the number of the entries belonging to LṘ
T , sends c and ( − → pk i ) i∈CS to P 2 .
• Receiver's step (R5): P 2 decrypts the ciphertext c and gains the message he want. For each i ∈ CS, j ∈ H, P 2 operates: β
The Correctness Of The Framework
Now let us check the correctness of the framework, i.e., the framework works in the case that P 1 and P 2 are honest. For each i ∈ CS, j ∈ H, we know
Because of the projection of H, we know
This means what P 2 gets is m H that indeed is P 2 wants.
The Security Of The Framework
With respect to the security of the framework, we have the following theorem. We defer the strick proof of Theorem 8 to section 5 and first give an intuitive analysis here as a warm-up. For the security of P 1 , the framework should prevent P 2 from gaining more than h messages. Using cut and choose technique, P 1 makes sure with some probability that each instance vector contains no more than h projective instance, which leads to P 2 learning extra messages is difficult. The following theorem guarantees that this probability is overwhelming.
Theorem 9.
Assume that the commitment schemes employed in the framework are a perfectly hiding commitment and a perfectly binding commitment. Then, in case that P 1 is honest and P 2 is corrupted, the probability that P 2 cheats to obtain more than h messages is at most 1/2 polys(k) .
Proof: According to the framework, there are two necessary conditions for P 2 's success in the cheating.
1) P 2 has to generate at least one illegal x i which contains more than h entries belonging to LṘ Λ . If not, P 2 cann't correctly decrypt more than h entries of c, because of the smoothness of H. Without loss of generality, we assume the illegal instance vectors are x l1 , x l2 , . . . , x l d . 2) All illegal instance vectors are lucky not to be chosen and all the instance vectors unchosen just are the illegal instance vectors, i.e., CS = {l 1 , l 2 , . . . , l d }. We prove this claim in two case.
a) In the case that
. So P 1 can detect P 2 's cheating and P 2 will gain nothing. b) In the case that CS = {l 1 , l 2 , . . . , l d } and CS − {l 1 , l 2 , . . . , l d } = ∅, there exists j(j ∈ CS ∧ x j is legal). Because of the smoothness of H, P 2 cannot correctly decrypt more than h entries of c. Now, let us estimate the probability that the second necessary condition is met. Note that, IHC(s) is a perfectly hiding commitment, IBC(s ′ ) is a perfectly binding commitment, and P 1 is honest, so the shared randomness r is uniformly distributed. We have
This means that the probability that P 2 cheats to obtain more than h messages is at most 1/2 polys(k) . From the proof of Theorem 9, it is easy to see that if the commitment schemes employed are the ones with statically properties, the probability that P 2 cheats to obtain more than h messages is negligible too, since the upper-bound of this probability deviates 1/2 polys(k) at most negligible distance.
For the security of P 2 , the framework first should prevent P 1 from learning P 2 's private input. There is a potential risk in Step R4 where P 2 encodes his private input. From Remark 6, we know that hard subset membership guarantees that for any PPT malicious P 1 , without being given π 1 i , the probability that P 1 learns any new knowledge is negligible. Thus P 2 's encoding is safe. Besides cheating P 2 of private input, it seems there is another obvious attack that malicious P 1 sends invalid messages, e.g. pk ij which (hk ij , pk ij ) / ∈ Range(KG(1 k , Λ, x ij )), to P 2 . This attack in fact doesn't matter. Its effect is equal to that of P 1 's altering his real input, which is allowed in the ideal world too.
The Communication Rounds
Step R1 and Step R2 can be taken in one round.
Step R5 is taken without communication. Each of other steps is taken in one round. Therefore, the total number of the communication rounds is six.
Compared with existing fully-simulatable protocols for oblivious transfer that without resorting to a random oracle or a trusted common reference string (CRS), our protocol is the most efficient one. On counting the total communication rounds of a protocol, we count that of the modified version. In the modified version, the consecutive communications of the same direction are combined into one round. The protocol for OT n h×1 of [6] costs one, two zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge respectively in initialization and in transfer a message, where each zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge is performed in four rounds. The whole protocol costs at least ten rounds. The protocol for OT n h of [28] costs one zeroknowledge proof of knowledge in initialization which is performed in three rounds at least, one protocol to extract a secret key corresponding to the identity of a message which is performed in four rounds, one zeroknowledge proof of knowledge in transfer a message which is performed in three rounds at least. We point out that the interactive proof of knowledge of a discrete logarithm modulo a prime, presented by [51] and taken as a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge protocol in [28] , to our best knowledge, is not known to be zero-knowledge. However, turning to the techniques of Σ-protocol, [14] make it zero-knowledge at cost of increment of three rounds in communication, which in turn induces the increment in communication rounds of the protocol of [28] . Taking all into consideration, this protocol costs at least ten rounds. The protocol for OT 
The Computational Overhead
We measure the computational overhead of the framework in terms of the number of public key operations (i.e., operations based on trapdoor functions, or similar operations) , because the overhead of public key operations, which depends on the length of their inputs, is greater than that of symmetric key operations (i.e., operations based on one-way functions) by orders of magnitude. Please see [38] to know which cryptographic operation is public key operation or private key operation.
As to the framework, the public key operations are Hash(.) and pHash(.), and the symmetric key operations are IHC(.) and IBC(.). In Step S3, P 1 takes n · #CS invocations of Hash(.) to encrypt his private input. In
Step R5, P 2 takes h · #CS invocations of pHash(.) to decrypt the messages he want. The value of #CS is poly s (k), poly s (k)/2, respectively, in the worst case and in the average case. Thus, fixing the problem we tackle (i.e., fixing the values of n and h), the efficiency only depends on the value of poly s (k). In Section 5 where we strictly prove the security of the framework, we'll see that in the case that only P 2 is corrupted, our simulator doesn't consider a situation in the real world that arises with probability at most 1/2 polys(k) . Therefore, setting poly s (k) = 40 is secure enough to use our framework in practice. In the worst case the computational overhead mainly consists of 40n invocations of Hash() taken by P 1 and 40h invocations of pHash() taken by P 2 ; in the average case the computational overhead mainly consists of 20n invocations of Hash() taken by P 1 and 20h invocations of pHash() taken by P 2 .
We point out that, our simulator also may fail (with negligible probability) in the case that P 1 is corrupted, but the probability of this event arising depends on the computational hiding of IBC and on the computational binding of IHC rather than the value of poly s (k) and has no influence on computational overhead. So we don't need to take this case into consideration here.
Compared with existing fully-simulatable protocols for oblivious transfer that without resorting to a random oracle or a trusted CRS, our DDH-based instantiation that will be presented in Section 7.1 is the most efficient one in computational overhead. The operations of the protocol in [6] are based on the non-standard assumptions, i.e., q-Power Decisional Diffie-Hellman and qStrong Diffie-Hellman (q-SDH) assumptions, which both are associated with bilinear groups. [13] indicates that q-SDH-based operations are more expensive that standardassumption-based operations. The operations of the protocol in [28] are based on Decisional Bilinear DiffieHellman (DBDH) assumption. Since bilinear curves are considerably more expensive than regular Elliptic curves [19] and DDH is obtainable from Elliptic curves, the operations in [6] , [28] are considerably more expensive than that DDH-based operations. Therefore, our DDHbased instantiation are more efficient than the protocols presented by [6] , [28] . The DDH-based protocol for OT 2 1 presented by [36] also are very efficient. However, it can be viewed as a specific case of our framework, thought some modification of the protocol is needed.
We have to admit that, in the context of a trusted CRS is available and only OT 2 1 is needed, [48] 's DDH-based instantiation, which is two-round efficient and of two public key encryption operations and one public key decryption operation, is the most efficient one, no matter seen from the number of communication rounds or the computational overhead.
A SECURITY PROOF OF THE FRAMEWORK
We prove Theorem 8 holds in this section. For notational clarity, we denote the entities, the parties and the adversary in the real world by P 1 , P 2 , A, and denote the corresponding entities in the ideal world by P
In the light of the parties being corrupted, there are four cases to be considered and we prove Theorem 8 holds in each case. For simplicity, we assume that the commitment schemes employed are a perfectly binding commitment scheme and a perfectly hiding commitment scheme. If the statically ones are employed, the proof can be done in the same way with a slight modification.
We don't know how to construct a strictly polynomialtime simulator for the adversary in the real world, in the case that only P 1 or P 2 is corrupted. Instead, expected polynomial-time simulators are constructed (see section 2.2 for the justification), which results in a failure of standard black-box reduction technique. Fortunately, the problem and its derived problems can be solved using the technique given by [26] .
In the case that P 1 Is Corrupted
In the case that P 1 is corrupted, A takes the full control of P 1 in the real world. Correspondingly, A's simulator, A ′ , takes the full control of P ′ 1 in the ideal world, where A ′ is constructed as follow.
• Initial input: A ′ holds the same k, I def = {1}, z = (z k ) k∈N , as A. What is more, A ′ holds a uniform distributed randomness r A ′ ∈ {0, 1} * . The parties P ′ 1 and P 1 , whom A ′ and A respectively is to corrupt, hold the same m.
• A ′ works as follows.
-
Step Sm1: A ′ corrupts P ′ fixes the initial inputs ofĀ to be identical to his except that fixes the randomness ofĀ to be a uniformly distributed value. A ′ activatesĀ, and suppliesĀ with m beforeĀ engages in the protocol for OT n h . In the following steps, A ′ builds an environment forĀ which simulates the real world. That is, A ′ disguises himself as P 1 and P 2 at the same time to interact withĀ. -Step Sm2: A ′ uniformly chooses a randomness Step R4 of the framework as the honest P 2 do. On receiving c and ( − → pk i ) i∈CS , A ′ correctly decrypts all entries of c and gainsĀ's full real private input m. Then A ′ sends m to the T T P . -Step Sim6: WhenĀ halts, A ′ halts with outputting whatĀ outputs. Without considering Step Sim4, A ′ is polynomial-time. However, taking Step Sim4 into consideration, this is not true any more. Let q(α), p(α) respectively denotes the probability thatĀ correctly reveals his commitment in Step Sim3 and in Procedure Υ, where α def = (1 k , z k , I, m, rĀ). Then, the expected times of repeating Υ in Step Sim4 is q(α)/p(α). Since the viewĀ holds before revealing his commitment in Step Sim3 is different from that in procedure Υ, q(α), p(α) are distinct. What the computational secrecy of IBC guarantees and only guarantees is |q(α) − p(α)| = µ(.). However, there is a risk that q(α)/p(α) is not bound by a polynomial. For example, q(α) = 1/2 k , p(α) = 1/2 2k , which result in q(α)/p(α) = 2 k . This is a big problem and gives rise to many other difficulties we will encounter later.
Fortunately, [26] encounters and solves the same problem and its derived problem as ours. In a little more details, [26] presents a protocol, in which P 1 , P 2 respectively sends a perfectly hiding commitment, a perfectly binding commitment, and the corresponding decommitments to each other as the situation of tossing coin of our framework. To prove the security in the case that P 1 is corrupted, [26] constructs a simulator in the same way as ours and encounters the same problem as ours.
Using the idea of [26] , we can overcome such problem too. Specifically, an expected polynomial-time simulator can be obtained by replacing Step Sim4 with Step Sim4.1, Sim4.2 given as follow.
• Step Sim4.1: A ′ estimates the value of q(α). A ′ repeats the following procedure, denoted Φ, until the number of the time ofĀ correctly revealing his commitment is up to poly(k), where poly(.) is a big enough polynomial. Φ: A ′ rewindsĀ to the end of Step S1 of the framework and A ′ honestly executes Step R2 and R3 of the framework to interact with it. Denote the number of times that Φ is repeated by d, then q(α) is estimated asq(α) def = poly(k)/d.
• Step Sim4.2: A ′ repeats the procedure Υ. In caseĀ correctly reveals the recorded value s, A ′ proceeds to the next step. In caseĀ correctly reveals a value which is different from s, A ′ outputs ambiguity 1 and halts. In case the number of the time of repeating Υ exceeds the value of poly(k)/q(α), A ′ outputs timeout and halts.
Proposition 12. The simulator A
′ is expected polynomialtime.
Proof: Conditioning on Step Sim4.1 is executed, the expected value of d is poly(k)/q(α). Choosing a big enough poly(.),q(α) is within a constant factor of q(α) with probability 1 − 2 poly(k) . Therefore, the expected running time of A ′ ,
ExpT ime
, is bounded by a polynomial. What is more, we have 1) The probability that A ′ outputs timeout is negligible.
2) The probability that A ′ outputs ambiguity 1 is negligible.
3) The output of A ′ in the ideal world and the output of A in the real world are computationally indistinguishable, i.e.,
Since the propositions above can be proven in the same way as [26] , we don't iterate such details here.
Proposition 13.
In the case that P 1 was corrupted, i.e., I = {1}, the equation (1) required by Definition 1 holds.
Proof: First let us focus on the real world. A's real input can be formulated as γ ← A(1 k , m, z k , r A , r 1 ). Note that in this case, P 2 's output is a determinate function of A's real input. Since A's real input is in its view, without loss of generality, we assume A's output, denoted α, constains its real input. Therefore, P 2 's output is a determinate function of A's output, where the function is , g(α) ). Then we have
Similarly, in the ideal world, we have
We use c = not ≡ here because there is a negligible probability that A ′ outputs timeout or ambiguity 1 , which makes h(.) undefined.
Let
What is more, assume that A ′ runs in a strictly polynomial-time. According to Proposition 20 we will present in Section 7, the proposition holds.
In fact, A ′ doesn't run in strictly polynomial-time, which results in a failure of above standard reduction. Fortunately, this difficulty can be overcome by truncating the rare executions of A ′ which are too long, then applying standard reduction techniques. Since the details is the same as [26] , we don't give them here and please see [26] for them.
In the case that P 2 Is Corrupted
In the case that P 2 is corrupted, A takes the full control of P 2 in the real world. Correspondingly, A ′ takes the full control of P ′ 2 in the ideal world. We construct A ′ as follows.
• Initial input: A ′ holds the same k, I def = {2}, z = (z k ) k∈N as A, and holds a uniformly distributed randomness r A ′ ∈ {0, 1} * . The parties P ′ 2 and P 2 hold the same private input H.
-
Step Sim1: A ′ corrupts P Step S3.3 to interact withĀ. Note that, in each repeating Ξ, the value A ′ commits to and the randomness used to generate the commitment in Step S1 are fresh and uniformly chosen.
-Step Sim4: 1) In case r =r, A ′ outputs f ailure and halts; 2) In case r =r ∧ ∀i(r i =r i → r i = 1 ∧ r i = 0), A ′ runs from scratch; 3) Otherwise, i.e., in case r =r ∧ ∃i(r i = 0 ∧ r i = 1), A ′ records the first one, denoted e, of these is and proceeds to next step. 
Remark 14. The aim of Step Sim3 and Sim4 is to prepare to extract the real input ofĀ. If the third case happens, then
* . Playing the role of P 1 and taking m ′ as his real input, A ′ follows Step S3.3 to complete the interaction withĀ. -Step Sim6: WhenĀ halts, A ′ halts with outputting whatĀ outputs..
Note that S doesn't simulate a situation in the real world that A cheats P 1 of more than h message. Fortunately, Theorem 9 guarantees that this situation arises with probability at most 1/2 polys(k) and so can be ignored.
Proposition 15. The simulator A
′ is expected polynomial-time.
Proof: First, let us focus on Step Sim3. In each repetition of Ξ, because of the perfectly hiding of IHC(.), and the uniform distribution of the value A ′ commits to, the chosen instance vectors are uniformly distributed. This lead to the probability thatĀ passes the check in each repetition is the same. Denote this probability by p.
The expected time of Step Sim3 is
ExpT ime Sim3 = (1/p) · T ime Ξ Under the same analysis, the probability thatĀ passes the check in Step Sim2 is p too. Then, the expected time that A ′ runs once from Step Sim1 to the beginning of Step Sim4 is
Second, let us focus on Step Sim4, especially the case that A ′ needs to run from scratch. Note that the initial inputs A ′ holds is the same in each trial. Thus the probability that A ′ runs from scratch in each trial is the same. We denote this probability by 1 − q. Then the expected time that A ′ runs from Step Sim1 to the beginning of Step Sim5 is
The reason there is 1 here is that A ′ has to run from scratch at least one time in any case.
The expected running time of A ′ in a whole execution is ExpT ime A ′ ≤ ExpT ime Sim1→Sim5 + T ime Sim5
Third, let us estimate the value of q, which is the probability that A ′ does not run from scratch in a trial. We denote this event by C. It's easy to see that event C happens, if and only if one of the following events happens.
1) Event B happens, where B denotes the even that A ′ halts before reaching Step Sim3. 2) EventB happens and R =R, where R andR respectively denotes the random variable which is defined as the shared randomness A ′ gets in Step Sim2 and Step Sim3.
3) EventB happens and there exists i such that R i = 0 ∧R i = 1 .
So q =P r(C)
=P r(B) + P r(B ∩ R =R)
It is easy to see that S 1 , S 2 , S 3 constitute a complete partition of ({0, 1} K )
Because of the perfectly hiding of IHC(.), and the uniform distribution of the value A ′ commits to, R and R are all uniformly distributed. We have
and
Combining equation (4), (5) and (6), we have
Combining equation (3) and (7), we have
which means the expected running time of A ′ is bound by a polynomial.
Lemma 16. The probability that A
′ outputs f ailure is less than 1/2 K−1 .
Proof: Let X be a random variable defined as the number of the trials in a whole execution. From the proof of Proposition 15, we know two facts. First, P r(X = i) = (1 − q) i−1 q < 1/2 i−1 . Second, in each trial the event A ′ outputs f ailure is the combined event ofB and R =R, where the combined event happens with the following probability.
P r(B ∩ R =R) = P r(B)P r(R =R|B) ≤ P r(R =R|B)
Combining equation (5), this probability is not more than 1/2 K . Therefore, the probability that A ′ outputs f ailure in a whole execution is 
Proof: First, we claim that the outputs of A ′ andĀ are computationally indistinguishable. The only point that the output of A ′ is different from that ofĀ is A ′ may outputs f ailure. Since the probability that this point arises is negligible, our claim holds. Second, we claim that the outputs of A andĀ are computationally indistinguishable. The only point that the view ofĀ is different from that of A is that the ciphertextĀ receives is generated by encrypting m ′ not m. Fortunately, SP HDHC t,h 's property smoothness guarantees that the ciphertext generated in the two way are computationally indistinguishable. Therefore, our claim holds.
Combining the two claims, the proposition holds.
Proposition 18.
In the case that P 2 was corrupted, i.e., I = {2}, the equation (1) required by Definition 1 holds.
Proof: Note that the honest parties P 1 and P ′ 1 end up with outputting nothing. Thus, the fact that the outputs of A ′ and A are computationally indistinguishable, which is supported by Lemma 17, directly prove this proposition holds.
Other Cases
In the case that both P 1 and P 2 are corrupted, A takes the full control of the two corrupted parties. In the ideal world, a similar situation also holds with respect to A ′ , P In the case that none of P 1 and P 2 is corrupted. The simulator A ′ is constructed as follows. A ′ usesĀ,P 1 , P 2 as subroutines, whereĀ,P 1 ,P 2 , respectively, is the copy of A, P 1 and P 2 . A ′ fixesĀ's initial inputs in the same way as in previous cases. A ′ chooses an arbitrarȳ m ∈ ({0, 1} * ) n and a uniformly distributed randomnessr 1 asP 1 's initial inputs. A ′ chooses an arbitrarȳ H ∈ Ψ and a uniformly distributed randomnessr 2 asP 2 's initial inputs. A ′ actives these subroutines and make the communication betweenP 1 andP 2 available toĀ. Note that, in the case that none of P 1 and P 2 is corrupted, what adversaries can see in real life only is the communication between honest parties. WhenĀ halts, A ′ halts with outputting whatĀ outputs. Obviously, A ′ runs in strictly polynomial-time and the equation (1) required by Definition 1 holds in this case.
HOW TO CONSTRUCT SP HDHC t,h EASILY
SP HDHC t,h holds so many properties that constructing it from scratch is not always easy. In this section, we reduce constructing SP HDHC t,h to constructing seemingly simpler hash systems. A idea naturally arising is that generating the instances independently in essence to obtain the required properties. We keep this idea in mind to proceed to construct SP HDHC t,h .
Smoothness
In this section, we describe how to obtain smoothness for a hash family. First, we introduce a lemma from [24] . 
where
Proof: Assume the proposition is false, then there exists a non-uniform PPT distinguisher D with an infinite sequence z = (z k ) k∈N , a polynomial poly(.), an infinite positive integer set G ⊆ N such that, for each k ∈ G, it holds that
We construct a distinguisher D ′ with an infinite sequence z = (z k ) k∈N for the ensembles X and Y as follows.
and j
where 
and 
, which meets the requirement of the smoothness. Loosely speaking, following Lemma 21, given a hash family H, if eachẍ was sampled in an independent way and its projective key is useless to obtain the value of Hash(1 k , Λ,ẍ, .), then H is smooth.
Hard Subset Membership
In this section, we deal with how to obtain hard subset membership for a hash family. where − − → XY and Φ( − − → XY ) are two probability ensembles defined as follows.
, it obviously holds. We proceed to prove it also holds in case Φ k ([poly 1 (k)]) [poly 1 (k)]. Assume it does not hold in this case, then there exists a non-uniform PPT distinguisher D with an infinite sequence z = (z k ) k∈N , a polynomial poly 2 (.), a infinite positive integer set G ⊆ N such that, for each k ∈ G,
It is easy to see that
Following triangle inequality, we have
Combining equation (8) (9) (10), we have
According to the definition of Φ j−1 k , Φ j k , the differences between them are the values of points i j , Φ k (i j ). Similarly, the only differences between
. Following triangle inequality, we have
Combining (11) (12), we know that
holds. Without loss of generality, we assume equation (13) holds (in case equation (14) holds, the proof can be done in similar way). We can construct a distinguisher D ′ with an infinite sequence z = (z k ) k∈N for the probability ensembles X and Y as follows.
Combining (13) (15), we have
This contradicts the fact X c = Y . Therefore, the proposition also holds in case
Lemma 23. Let H = (P G, IS, DI, KG, Hash, pHash, Cheat) be a hash family. Let n Definition 4 . If H meets the following three conditions,
then H has property hard subset membership.
That is
i.e.,
, which meets the requirement of the property hard subset membership.
Loosely speaking, Lemma 23 shows that, given a hash family H, if random variables 
Reducing To Constructing Considerably Simpler Hash
In this section, we reduce constructing SP HDHC t,h to constructing considerably simpler hash.
Definition 24 (smooth projective hash family that holds properties distinguishability and hard subset membership). H = (P G 
It is easy to see that the projection and smoothness are two contradictory properties. That is, for any instance x, it holds at most one of the two. Therefore,Ṙ Λ ∩R Λ = ∅.
Theorem 25 (reduce constructing SP HDHC t,h to constructing SPHDH). Given a SPHDH H, then we can efficiently gain a SP HDHC t,h H.
Proof: Let H = (P G, IS, DI, KG, Hash, pHash). First, we construct a new hash system H = (P G, IS, DI, KG, Hash, pHash, Cheat) as follows.
• The procedures P G, DI, KG, Hash, pHash directly take the corresponding procedures from H.
, a i ← IS(1 k , Λ, 0); finally outputs a. Second, we prove H is a SP HDHC t,h . From the construction, we know that it remains to prove that H holds properties smoothness, hard subset membership and feasible cheating. However, this fact directly follows Lemma 21, Lemma 23 and Lemma ??. Therefore, H is a SP HDHC t,h .
Sometimes it is not easy to gain smoothness for a hash family. In this case we have to construct a hash family, defined as follows, as the first step to our goal.
Definition 26 (ǫ-universal projective hash family that holds properties distinguishability and hard subset membership). H = (P G, IS, DI, KG, Hash, pHash) is a ǫ-universal projective hash family that holds properties distinguishability and hard subset membership (ǫ-UPHDH), if and only if H is specified as follows.
• All algorithms are specified as same as in SP HDH's definition, i.e., Definition 24 . and H has the following properties 1) The properties projection, distinguishability and hard subset membership are specified as same as in Definition 24.
2) ǫ-universality. Intuitively speaking, it requires the probability of guessing the hash value ofẍ is at most ǫ. That is, for any sufficiently large k, any
where (HK, P K) ← KG(1 k , Λ,ẍ), the probability is taken over the randomness of KG.
Compared with SPHDH, ǫ-UPHDH relaxes the upper bound of the probability of guessing the hash value of x to a higher value. Assume ǫ < 1, as [15] , [32] , we can efficiently gain a SPHDH from a ǫ-UPHDH.
Theorem 27. Given a ǫ-UPHDH H, where ǫ < 1, then we can efficiently gain a SPHDH H.
The way to prove this theorem is to construct a required algorithm, which can be gained by a simply application of the Leftover Hash Lemma (please see [39] for this lemma). The detailed construction essentially is the same as [15] . Considering the space, we don't iterate it here.
Combining Theorem 25 and Theorem 27, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 28 (reduce constructing SP HDHC t,h to constructing ǫ-UPHDH). Given a ǫ-UPHDH H, then we can efficiently gain a SP HDHC t,h H.
CONSTRUCTING SP HDHC t,h
In this section, we construct SP HDHC t,h respectively under the lattice assumption, the decisional DiffieHellman assumption, the decisional N -th residuosity assumption and the decisional quadratic residuosity assumption. Theorem 25 and Corollary 28 show that, to construct a SP HDHC t,h , what we need to do is to construct a SPHDH or construct a ǫ-UPHDH (ǫ < 1).
A Construction Under The Decisional DiffieHellman Assumption
Background
Let Gen(1 k ) be an algorithm such that randomly chooses a cyclic group and outputs the group's description G =< g, q, * >, where g, q, * respectively is the generator, the order, the operation of the group.
The DDH problem is how to construct an algorithm to distinguish the two probability ensembles DDH 1 def = {DDH 1 (1 k )} k∈N and DDH 2 def = {DDH 2 (1 k )} k∈N which are formulate as follows.
• DDH 2 (1 k ): Basically operates in the same way as
Proof: For this system, the probability ensembles Hm 1 , Hm 2 mentioned in the definition of SPHDH can be described as follows.
Finally outputs (Λ,ẋ).
Finally outputs (Λ,ẍ). [17] can be used as a perfectly binding commitment scheme. The encryption scheme is directly based on the problem of discrete log. Since the task of solving the problem DDH can be reduced to that of solving the problem discrete log, the encryption scheme is based on DDH essentially. The DDH-based commitment scheme presented by [47] is a perfectly hiding one. Therefore, using those two commitment schemes and our DDHbased SP HDHC t,h , we gain a concrete protocol for OT n h based only on DDH. To reach the best efficiency, we should use the DDH of the group which is on elliptic curves. See Section 4.5 for further discussion.
A Construction Under Lattice
Background
Learning with errors (LWE) is an average-case problem. [50] shows that its hardness is implied by the worstcase hardness of standard lattice problem for quantum algorithms.
In lattice, the modulo operation is defined as x mod y def = x − x/y y. Then we know x mod 1 def = x − x . Let β be an arbitrary positive real number. Let Ψ β be a probability density function whose distribution is over [0, 1) and obtained by sampling from a normal variable with mean 0 and standard deviation β/ √ 2π and reducing the result modulo 1, more specifically
Given an arbitrary integer q ≥ 2, an arbitrary probability destiny function φ : [0, 1) → R + , the discretization of φ over Z q is defined as
LW E can be formulated as follows. 
Definition 34 (Learning With Errors
where q, g are positive integers, χ : Z q → R + is a probability density function.
With respect to the hardness of LW E, [50] proves that setting appropriate parameters, we can reduce two worst-case standard lattice problems to LW E, which means LW E is a very hard problem. We emphasize the fact that the reduction of Lemma 35 is quantum, which implies that any algorithm breaking any cryptographic schemes which only based on LW E is an algorithm solving at least one of the problems SIVP and GapSVP.
How to precisely set the parameters as values to gain a concrete LW E, which is as hard as required in Lemma 35 is beyond the scope of this paper. To see such examples and more details, we recommend [50] and [48] .
The instantiation of SPHDH, which we will present soon, needs to use a LW E-based public key cryptosystem presented by [22] , which is a slight variant of [50] 's cryptosystem. This cryptosystem is described as follow.
• Message space: {0, 1}.
m (which means each entry of e is independently drawn from Z q according to χ), b ← A s + e mod q, pubk ← (A, b), sk ← s, finally outputs a public-private key pair (pubk, sk).
• Enc(.), Dec(.): Since Enc(.), Dec(.) are immaterial to understand this paper, we omit their detailed procedure here. [22] shows that if LW E q,Ψα is hard, choosing appropriate parameters, this cryptosystem holds the following properties.
1) It provides security against chosen plaintext attack, though we only need semantic security here. 2) For each A ∈ (Z q ) m×k , we have
where b is said to be messy if and only if, ∀m 0 , m 1 ∈ {0, 1}, the statistical distance between the distribution of Enc A, b (m 0 ) and that of Enc A, b (m 1 ) is negligible. In other word, b is said to be messy if and only if, Enc A, b (.) loses messages and so its ciphertext can't be decrypted using any private key
m×k and its trapdoor T , then there exists an efficient decision algorithm IsM essy holds the following two property. First, P r (IsM essy(A, T, b 
A Concrete Protocol For OT n h With Security Against Quantum Algorithms
The security proof of the framework guarantees that, any adversary breaking the framework is an algorithm breaking at least one of cryptographic tools used in the framework. Moreover, it's generally believed that lattice-based cryptography resists quantum attacks [41] . Therefore, to gain an instantiation of our framework with security against quantum algorithms, it suffices to adopt lattice-based instantiations of the cryptographic tools. Thus, it remains to find a IHC and a IBC with such security level. Though there exists general methods to construct perfectly binding commitments and perfectly hiding commitments from one-way functions (or oneway permutations) (see [23] Chapter 4), the resulting lattice-based commitments seem too expensive. Thus, other approach is needed.
First, based on the result of [22] , we can get a relatively efficient statically binding commitment.
Lemma 41 ( [22]
). There exists an efficient algorithm for the lattice-based cryptosystem mentioned early such that, for all but at most negligible fraction of public key generated by KeyGen, given a trapdoor for the matrix A, and a public key (A, A T s + e), it can efficiently extract the unique secret key s.
The lattice-based cryptosystem can be used as a statically binding commitment in the following way. In commit phase, P 1 sends a public key (A, b) along with E A, b (m) to P 2 . The computationally hiding directly follows the security level of the cryptosystem. In reveal phase, P 1 sends the trapdoor of A, the value m, and the randomness used in commit phase to P 2 . Following Lemma 41, almost all legitimate public keys, respectively, correspond to a unique private key. This guarantees that an encryption relative to legitimate public keys have a unique decryption. Therefore, it holds statically binding.
Second, combining the works of [2] , [25] , [29] , [40] , we can get a relatively efficient statically hiding commitment. [29] presents a efficient way to construct statically hiding commitments from any collision-free hash. Assuming one of the lattice problems SIV P and SV P is hard, [25] shows that [2] 's lattice-based hash of suitably chosen parameters is collision-free. Under the assumption that GapSV P
is hard in the worst case, [40] later also shows that the lattice-based hash is collision-free. Therefore, applying [29] 's method to [2] 's hash, we get a lattice-based statically hiding commitment. Now we can gain a concrete protocol for OT n h with security against quantum algorithms, this is summarized by the following theorem.
Theorem 42.
Assuming that one of the lattice problems SIV P and GapSV P is hard for quantum algorithms, instantiating the OT n h framework with the lattice-based SP HDHC t,h , and the lattice-based commitment schemes (no matter the ones that are got by applying the general method or the ones we suggests above), the resulting concrete protocol for OT n h is secure against quantum algorithms.
A Construction Under The Decisional N-th Residuosity Assumption
Verifiable-ǫ-universal Projective Hash Family
In this section, we will build a instantiation of ǫ-UPHDH (ǫ < 1) from a instantiation of a hash system called verifiable-ǫ-universal projective hash family by [32] . Therefore, it is necessary to introduce the definition of this hash system. Definition 43 (verifiable-ǫ-universal projective hash family, [32] ). H = (P G, IS, IT, KG, Hash, pHash) is a ǫ-universal projective hash family (ǫ-VUPH), if and only if H is specified as follows.
• The algorithms P G, IS, KG, Hash, pHash are specified as same as in ǫ-UPHDH's definition, i.e., Definition 26.
• IS is a PPT algorithm that takes a security parameter k, a family parameter Λ as input and outputs a tuple, i.e., (ẇ,ẋ,ẍ) ← IS(1 k , Λ).
• IT is a PPT algorithm that takes a security parameter k, a family parameter Λ, two instances as input and outputs a bit , i.e., b ← IT (1 k , Λ, x 1 , x 2 ).
and H has the following properties 1) The properties projection, ǫ-universality are specified as same as that in ǫ-UPHDH's definition, i.e., Definition 26. 2) Verifiability. First, for any sufficiently large k, any Λ ∈ Range(P G(1 k )), any (ẇ,ẋ,ẍ) ∈ Range(IS(1 k , Λ)), it holds that IT (1 k , Λ,ẋ,ẍ) = IT (1 k , Λ,ẍ,ẋ) = 1. Second, for any sufficiently large k, any (Λ, x 1 , x 2 ) such that IT (1 k , Λ, x 1 , x 2 ) = 1, at least one of x 1 , x 2 is ǫ-universal.
It is easy to see that verifiability guarantees any instance x holds at most one of the properties projection and universality. Therefore, we have the following lemma. 
Background
Let Gen(1 k ) be an algorithm that operates as follows.
• Gen(1 k ): (p, q) ∈ U {(p, q)|(p, q) ∈ (P, P), p, q > 2, |p| = |q| = k, gcd(pq, (p − 1)(q − 1)) = 1}, N ← pq, finally outputs N . The problem decisional N-th residuosity (DNR), first presented by [46] , is how to construct an algorithm to distinguish two probability ensembles DN R 1 def = {DN R 1 (1 k )} k∈N and DN R 2 def = {DN R 2 (1 k )} k∈N which are formulate as follows.
• DN R 1 (1 k 
finally outputs (N, b).
• DN R 2 (1 k ): N ← Gen(1 k ), b ∈ U Z * N 2 , finally outputs (N, b) . The DNR assumption is that there is no efficient algorithm solving the problem. In other words, it is assumed that DN R 1 c = DN R 2 . Our instantiation of ǫ-UPHDH is build from a DNRbased instantiation of ε-VUPH (ε < 1) presented by [32] . The instantiation of ε-VUPH is stated as follows.
• P G(1 k ): N ← Gen(1 k ), a ∈ U Z * N 2 , T ← N 2 log N , g ← a N ·T mod N 2 , Λ ← (N, g), finally outputs Λ.
• IS ( • KG(1 k , Λ): (N, g) ← Λ, hk ∈ U Z N 2 , pk ← g hk mod N 2 , finally outputs (hk, pk).
• Hash(1 k , Λ, x, hk): (N, g) ← Λ, y ← x hk mod N 2 , finally outputs y.
• pHash(1 k , Λ, x, pk, w): (N, g) ← Λ, y ← pk w mod N 2 , finally outputs y.
Detailed Construction
We now present our DNR-based instantiation of ǫ-UPHDH (ǫ < 1) as follows.
• IS ( • KG(1 k , Λ, x): (N, g) ← Λ, hk ∈ U Z N 2 , pk ← g hk mod N 2 , finally outputs (hk, pk).
Theorem 45.
Assuming DNR is a hard problem, the hash system is a ǫ-UPHDH (ǫ < 1).
Proof: It is easy to see that the hash system directly inherits properties ε-universality and projection from the instantiation of ǫ-VUPH. Following Lemma 44, the hash system holds property distinguishability. It remains to prove that the hash system holds the property hard subset membership.
For this system, the probability ensembles Hm 1 , Hm 2 mentioned in the definition of ǫ-UPHDH can be described as follows.
• Hm 1 (1 k ): Λ ← P G(1 k ), (N, g) ← Λ, r ∈ U Z * N ,ẋ ← g r mod N 2 . Finally outputs (Λ,ẋ).
• Hm 2 (1 k ): Λ ← P G(1 k ), (N, g) ← Λ, r, v ∈ U Z * N , x ← g r (1 + vN ) mod N 2 . Finally outputs (Λ,ẍ).
It is clear that Hm 1 c = Hm 2 . Therefore, the hash system holds the property hard subset membership.
A Construction Under The Decisional Quadratic Residuosity Assumption
We reuse Gen(1 k ) defined in section 7.3.2. Let J N be the subgroup of Z * N of elements with Jacobi symbol 1. The problem decisional quadratic residuosity (DQR) is how to construct an algorithm to distinguish the two probability ensembles DQR 1 def = {DQR 1 (1 k )} k∈N and DQR 2 def = {DQR 2 (1 k )} k∈N which are formulated as follows.
• DQR 1 (1 k ): N ← Gen(1 k ), x ∈ U J N , finally outputs (N, x).
• DQR 2 (1 k ): N ← Gen(1 k ), r ∈ U Z * N , x ← r 2 mod N , finally outputs (N, x).
The DQR assumption is that there is no efficient algorithm solving the problem. That is, it is assumed that DQR 1 c = DQR 2 . As in section 7.3, the hash system we aim to achieve is an instantiation of ǫ-UPHDH. We will build it on an instantiation of ε-VUPH presented by [32] which is constructed under DQR assumption. Considering the space, we do not iterate the instantiation of ε-VUPH here, and directly present our instantiation of ǫ-UPHDH as follows.
• P G(1 k ): (p, q) ∈ U (P, P), where |p| = |q| = k, p < q < 2p − 1, p = q = 3 mod 4, a ∈ U Z * N , T ← 2 log N , g ← a 2·T mod N , Λ ← (N, g), finally outputs Λ.
• IS(1 k , Λ, δ): (N, g) ← Λ, r ∈ U Z N ,ẋ ← g r mod N , x ← N − g r mod N ,ẅ ← r , finally outputs (ẋ,ẇ) if δ = 0, (ẍ,ẅ) if δ = 1.
• DI(1 k , Λ, x, w): (N, g) ← Λ, r ← w; checks that N > 2 2k , g, x ∈ Z * N . Outputs 0, if x = g r mod N and all the test pass. Outputs 1, if x = N − g r mod N and all the test pass.
• KG(1 k , Λ, x): (N, g) ← Λ, hk ∈ U Z N , pk ← g hk mod N , finally outputs (hk, pk).
• Hash(1 k , Λ, x, hk): (N, g) ← Λ, y ← x hk mod N , finally outputs y.
• pHash(1 k , Λ, x, pk, w): (N, g) ← Λ, y ← pk w mod N , finally outputs y.
Theorem 46.
Assuming DQR is a hard problem, the hash system is a ǫ-UPHDH, where ǫ < 1.
This theorem can be proven in a similar way in which Theorem 45 is proven.
